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Abstract We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in
Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008). We provide a complete characteriza-
tion of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto
games, where one of the players has an advantage over the other. By this we complete
the characterization given in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008), where the
strategies for symmetric case were fully characterized and some of the optimal strat-
egies for the non-symmetric case were obtained. We find a group of completely new
atomic strategies, which are used as building components for the optimal strategies.
Our results are applicable to discrete variants of all-pay auctions.
Keywords General Lotto · Allocation games · All-pay auctions
JEL Classification C72 · C02 · D44
1 Introduction
General Lotto games are allocation games introduced in Hart (2008) as a technical tool
for studying Colonel Blotto games. These are allocation games, where two (or more)
players engage in a ‘winner-takes-all’ conflicts over several fronts, or ‘battlefields’,
allocating their limited resources to them. Games of this kind have numerous appli-
cations in the areas such as R&D races, presidential elections, auctions, tournaments
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as well as anti-terrorism efforts or information systems security (for an overview of
research on allocation games, see Kovenock and Roberson 2010).
In the case of General Lotto games, the battlefields are assumed to be indistinguish-
able, and, instead of deciding how many resources to assign to which battlefield, the
players decide which fraction of the battlefields different amounts of the resources
will be assigned to. Thus, budget constraints of the players are expressed in terms of
expected values rather then in terms of total amounts of the resources. The strategies
of the players are probability distributions over possible amounts of the resources. If
these amounts are allowed to take any (non-negative) real value, then these probability
distributions are over non-negative real numbers and the game is called continuous.
If these amounts take integer values (e.g. because there exists some minimum unit of
exchange), then the game is called discrete. Additionally, if all players face the same
budget constraints, then the game is called symmetric, and it is called non-symmetric
otherwise.
Myerson (1993) introduces this formulation of competitive resource allocation in
a model of electoral competition in which each candidate makes promises involving
how the budget will be distributed among the electorate and each voter votes for the
candidate who promises the highest transfer. They are modelled by offer distributions
which are probability distributions over non-negative real numbers. An offer distribu-
tion, represented by a cumulative distribution function F , specifies what fractions of
the electorate are promised values from different intervals. Thus the mass of an interval
(x, x +ε) is the fraction of voters to whom a value from (x, x +ε) is promised. Budget
constraints of each candidate are expressed as constraints on the average offer per voter
that a candidate can promise. Budget constraints of all the candidates are assumed to
be equal and this model results in a multi-player symmetric General Lotto game.
Sahuguet and Persico (2006) extend this model to a situation where there are only
two candidates but with unequal budgets constraints. This leads to a non-symmetric
General Lotto game. A recent paper by Kovenock and Roberson (2009) extends this
model further, to allow the parties to vary in the efficiency with which they are able
to target transfers to different groups of voters.
Also related is Dekel et al. (2008) who use a sequential variant of the General Lotto
game to investigate vote buying games where two parties, alternately, make one of
the two possible offers: up-front payments or campaign promises. Two games with
these two different types of offers are studied with the assumption of a minimal unit of
exchange (i.e. offers can be made in multiples of a smallest money unit ε > 0 only).
The model considered is essentially a sequential variant of General Lotto game. It is
also closely related to dollar auction game of Shubik (1971).
Sahuguet and Persico (2006) connect the non-symmetric General Lotto games to
complete information all-pay auctions, as studied by Baye et al. (1996). In this kind of
auctions equilibria in pure strategies do not exist. The mixed strategies are probability
distributions over possible bids. As shown by Sahuguet and Persico (2006), there is
a correspondence between the budget constraints in the model of political competi-
tion they study and the bidders valuations in all-pay auctions, as well as between the
equilibrium mixed strategies in the auctions game and the political promises game.
A symmetric continuous variant of General Lotto games was solved by Bell
and Cover (1980), while Sahuguet and Persico (2006) provided the solution for the
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non-symmetric case of these games. The main feature of these results is that in both,
the symmetric and the non-symmetric variants of the game, there exists unique Nash
equilibrium. If the game is symmetric, then in equilibrium each player uses a uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 2a] (where a denotes the budget constraints of each
player). If the game is non-symmetric, then the advantaged player sticks to the uniform
distribution, while the disadvantaged one plays a mixed distribution, by giving up and
playing 0 with some probability, and distributing the remaining probability uniformly
over the interval (0, 2a]. The proof in Sahuguet and Persico (2006) uses a reduction
to “all-pay-auctions”, thus providing a link between the multi-object auctions and
General Lotto games. A significantly easier proof based on first principles was given
by Hart (2008).
A discrete variant of General Lotto games was solved by Hart (2008). Apart from
providing the value of these games, Hart (2008) obtained full characterization of opti-
mal strategies of the players in the cases where the game is symmetric or very close
to symmetric. The interesting feature of the strategies found is that they show how the
uniform distributions that are optimal in the continuous variant are “approximated”
by the discrete distributions. The optimal strategies found are convex combinations of
discrete uniform distributions over odd and even numbers within the interval [0, 2a].
Thus if the game is discrete, then a player may, but does not have to, use a uniform
distribution over integer numbers within the interval.
If the game is non-symmetric, then Hart (2008) provides full characterization of
optimal strategies only for the case where both a and b are not integers and a = b.
In the remaining cases it was shown that one of the players always has a unique optimal
strategy (it may be player A or B, depending on the values of budget constraints), and
the optimal strategy was provided for all the cases. In the case of the other player, only
a subset of his optimal strategies was provided. Additionally, bounds on the maximal
value obtaining non-zero probability and bounds on the probability of playing zero
were given for these optimal strategies.
It is interesting to note that the connection between the General Lotto games and
“all-pay-auctions” extends to the discrete variant as well. The examples of optimal
strategies found by Cohen and Sela (2007) for discrete “all-pay-auctions” display fea-
tures similar to the optimal strategies found by Hart (2008) for discrete General Lotto
games. The players use uniform distributions on odd or even numbers over the inter-
val determined by their valuations, with disadvantaged player giving up and playing
0 with some probability.
In this paper we fill in the missing cases by providing complete characterization
of the optimal strategies in discrete General Lotto games. Such a characterization is
useful for the following reasons. Firstly, as we discussed above, General Lotto games
are of interest on their own, due to their connection to political economics and multi-
object auctions. In these applications a continuous variant was mostly used, however
in most cases it should be considered as a simplification, as usually there exists a
minimal unit of exchange, and agents cannot propose any real number (e.g. as their
promises to electorate). Thus it is important to see how the analysis under the conti-
nuity assumption corresponds to the discrete case and if the interesting features of the
results obtained are not significantly affected by this simplification. Moreover, using
the optimal strategies for discrete General Lotto games one could try to solve the
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unsolved variants of the discrete Colonel Blotto games (see Hart 2008 for the cases
solved so far).
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we formally define the continuous
General Lotto game and provide the associated results. In Sect. 3 we formally define
the discrete variant of the game. In Sect. 4 we give the complete characterization of
the optimal strategies for the game. In Sect. 5 we describe the connection with Colonel
Blotto game and we conclude in Sect. 6. The Appendix contains a more technical part
of the proofs.
2 Continuous General Lotto games
There are two players, A and B, who simultaneously choose probability distributions
over non-negative real numbers. The distributions are restricted by two positive num-
bers a, b > 0, so that the expectations under the distributions proposed must be a and
b for players A and B, respectively. Throughout the paper we will identify random
variables with their distributions. Saying that a player proposes a random variable X ,
we will mean that he proposes a distribution of a random variable which we denote
by X .
Let X and Y be the random variables proposed by A and B, respectively. The payoff
of player A is given by
H(X, Y ) := P(X > Y ) − P(X < Y ). (1)
while the payoff of player B is −H(X, Y ). Hence the game is a zero sum game. This
defines a Continuous Colonel Lotto game Λ(a, b). The game is called symmetric if
a = b and it is called non-symmetric otherwise.
The main result, providing the solution and full characterization of Nash equi-
librium, obtained by Bell and Cover (1980) and Sahuguet and Persico (2006) is as
follows.
Theorem 1 Let a, b > 0. The value of Continuous General Lotto game Λ(a, b) is
val Λ(a, b) = 1 − b
a
,
and the unique optimal strategies are X∗ = U (0, 2a) for Player A and Y ∗ = (1 −
b/a)10 + (b/a)U (0, 2a) for Player B.
U (x, y) is used to denote the uniform distribution over the interval [x, y], while
1x denotes a distribution where x is assigned probability 1. If the game is symmetric,
then the unique optimal strategy for each of the players is to propose uniform distribu-
tion over the interval [0, 2a]. If the game is non-symmetric, then the unique optimal
strategy for the advantaged player, A, is still to propose uniform distribution over the
interval [0, 2a]. The situation for the disadvantaged player changes, however, and his
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unique optimal strategy is a mixed distribution, that puts probability 1 − b/a on 0 and
distributes b/a uniformly on the interval (0, 2a].1
3 Discrete General Lotto games
In the discrete variant of the General Lotto Games the strategies of the players are
restricted, so that each of them can propose a discrete probability distribution over
non-negative integer numbers. Thus the set of strategies of a player C ∈ {A, B} is
SC =
{
p ∈ [0, 1]N≥0 :
+∞∑
i=0
pi = 1 and
+∞∑
i=0
i pi = c
}
,
where c = a, if C = A and c = b, if C = B. Every such strategy can be represented
by
∑+∞
i=0 pi 1i , where pi = P(X = i). Given a, b > 0, we will denote the associated
Discrete General Lotto game by Γ (a, b).
In the next section we give the complete characterization of the optimal strategies
in Discrete General Lotto games.
4 Solution of the discrete General Lotto game
All random variables considered from now on are non-negative and integer-val-
ued. As we mentioned above, every random variable X is
∑+∞
i=0 pi 1i , where pi =
P(X = i) and 1i denotes Dirac’s measure which puts probability 1 on i . Also
E(X) = ∑+∞i=1 iP(X = i) = ∑+∞i=1 P(X ≥ i). Expected payoff of player A from
using strategy X against strategy Y of player B is:
H(X, Y ) =
+∞∑
i=0
pi [P(i > Y ) − P(i < Y )] =
+∞∑
i=0




pi [P(Y ≥ i) + P(Y ≥ i + 1)].
Notice that H satisfies the following properties:
H(X, Y ) = −H(Y, X), (2)
H(αX1 + βX2, Y ) = αH(X1, Y ) + βH(X2, Y ). (3)
The following two distributions were crucial for players strategies discovered
in Hart (2008):





















Distributions U mO and U
m
E can be thought of as “uniform on odd numbers” and “uniform
on even numbers”, respectively. We will use
U m = {U mE ,U mO }
to denote the set of these distributions. We will also use umO and umE to denote stochastic
vectors representing these distributions.
As was shown in Hart (2008), for every Y it holds that






P(Y ≥ i) ≥ 1 − E(Y )
m
, (4)
with equality if and only if
∑+∞
j=2m+1 P(Y ≥ j) = 0 or, in other words, Y ≤ 2m. For
every Y it also holds that










≥ 1 − E(Y ) + 1
m + 1 , (5)
with equality if and only if
∑+∞
j=2m+2 P(Y ≥ j) = 0 or, in other words, Y ≤ 2m + 1.
We extend this repertoire with the following distributions: W mj (with 1 ≤ j ≤





[1, 0, 2, . . . , 0, 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2( j−1)





2m + 1 [0, 2, . . . , 0, 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2( j−1)
, 0, 1, 2 0, 2, . . . , 0, 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(m− j)
]T .
Distribution W mj could be thought of as distribution U
m
O distorted at the first 2 j+1 posi-
tions with a sort of 2-moving average, so that P(W mj = i) = (P(U jO = i−1)+P(U jO =
i +1))/2, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 j (where P(U jO = −1) = 0). Similarly, distribution V mj could
be thought of as distribution U mE distorted at the first 2 j positions with a sort of 2-
moving average, so that P(V mj = i) = (P(U j−1E = i − 1) + P(U j−1E = i + 1))/2,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 j − 1 (where P(U j−1E = −1) = 0). It could be also thought of as
distribution W m+1j ‘shifted to the left’ by one position.
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We will also use
W m = {W m1 , . . . , W mm−1}
to denote the set of distributions W mj , as well as
V m = {V m1 , . . . , V mm }
to denote the set of distributions V mj . These sets are defined for m ≥ 0. In the case
of m < 2, we assume that W m = ∅. Similarly, in the case of m < 1 we assume that
V m = ∅.
Additionally, will consider the following distribution, defined for m ≥ 1:








which could be thought of as uniform on even numbers from 2 to 2m − 2, or as
the distribution U m−1O ‘shifted to the right’ by one position. We will also use umO↑1 to
denote stochastic vector associated with this distribution.





[1, 0, 2, . . . , 0, 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(m−1)
, 0, 1]T ,





Let pi = P(Y = i). For every Y it holds that

























≥ 1 − E(Y )
m
+ p2 j − p0
2m
(6)
with equality if and only if
∑+∞
j=2m+1 P(Y ≥ j) = 0 or, in other words, Y ≤ 2m.








[P(Y ≥ 2i − 1) + P(Y ≥ 2i)]


















≥ 1 − 2E(Y )
2m + 1 +
p2 j−1
2m + 1 (7)
with equality if and only if
∑+∞
j=2m+2 P(Y ≥ j) = 0 or, in other words, Y ≤ 2m + 1.




























≥ 1−E(Y ) − 1




with equality if and only if
∑+∞
j=2m P(Y ≥ j) = 0 or, in other words, Y ≤ 2m − 1.
Before starting the analysis, we introduce some additional notation that will be
used. Given a distribution X , a set of distributions Y and λ1, λ2 ∈ R, we will use
λ1 X + λ2Y = {λ1 X + λ2Y : Y ∈ Y }
to denote the set of distributions that can be obtained by linearly combining X and the
distributions from Y with coefficients λ1 and λ2, respectively. Similarly, given two
sets of distributions X and Y as well as λ1, λ2 ∈ R, we will use
λ1X + λ2Y = {λ1 X + λ2Y : X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y }
to denote the set of distributions that can be obtained by linearly combining distri-
butions from X and Y with coefficients λ1 and λ2, respectively. Given a set of
distributions X we will use conv(X ) to denote the set of all convex combinations of
distributions from X .
Hart (2008) provided full characterization of optimal strategies for both players in
the cases where a = b are both integers and where a = b and neither a nor b are
integers. The cases left incomplete in Hart (2008) are
– a is an integer and b < a,
– a is not an integer and b ≤ a.
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4.1 The case of integer a and b < a
We start the analysis with the first case, where a is an integer and b < a. The following
theorem characterizing this case was shown in Hart (2008).
Theorem 2 (Hart) Let a > b > 0, where a is an integer. Then the value of General
Lotto game Γ (a, b) is
val Γ (a, b) = a − b
a
= 1 − b
a
.
The optimal strategies are as follows:
(i) Strategy U aO is the unique optimal strategy of Player A.
(ii) The strategies (1−b/a)10+(b/a)Z with Z ∈ conv(U a) are optimal strategies
of Player B.
(iii) Every optimal strategy Y of Player B satisfies Y ≤ 2a and
1 − b
a
≤ P(Y = 0) ≤ 1 − b
a + 1 .
Thus, apart from establishing the value of the game, the theorem above provides
the unique optimal strategy for the advantaged player A. It also gives examples of
optimal strategies for player B and provides bounds on the probability player B puts
on 0 and maximal value that can get non-zero probability. What is missing in this case
is the complete characterization of the optimal strategies for the disadvantaged player
B. We characterize them in two theorems covering the case where b ≤ a − 1 first and
then the case where a − 1 < b < a.
Theorem 3 Let a − 1 ≥ b > 0, where a is an integer. The strategy Y is optimal for











Z , with Z ∈ conv
(
U a ∪ W a ∪ {U aO↑1}
)
.
Proof Suppose that Y is an optimal strategy for Player B. By Theorem 2 we have












Since Y is optimal and, by Theorem 2, val Γ (a, b) = 1 − b/a so for any X with
E(X) = a it must hold that
1 − b
a
























Thus Z is optimal (i.e. such that Y is optimal) if and only if











where p0 = P(X = 0).
Consider distributions T ai, j = λ1i + (1 − λ)1 j with E(T ai, j ) = a (i.e. with λ =
( j − a)/( j − i)). Take any T ai, j with 0 < i ≤ a ≤ j . For optimal Z , from (10), we
have:
H(Z , T ai, j ) = λH(Z , 1i ) + (1 − λ)H(Z , 1 j ) ≥ 0.
Let wi = H(Z , 1i ). Then we have
( j − a)wi + (a − i)w j ≥ 0. (11)
Since U aO puts strictly positive mass on all positive and odd j ≤ 2a −1, so for any odd
i and j such that 1 ≤ i ≤ a ≤ j ≤ 2a − 1 we have U aO = τT ai, j + (1 − τ)W for some
0 < τ < 1 and W ≥ 0 with E(W ) = a. Since U aO is optimal and P(U aO = 0) = 0, so
for optimal Z it must be that H(Z ,U aO) = 0. Thus τ H(Z , T ai, j )+(1−τ)H(Z , W ) = 0
and since, by optimality of Z , H(Z , T ai, j ) ≥ 0 and H(Z , W ) ≥ 0, so H(Z , T ai, j ) = 0.
Hence for i and j odd and such that 1 ≤ i ≤ a ≤ j ≤ 2a − 1, (11) becomes equality.
Suppose that a is even. Taking i = a −1 from (11) we get w j ≥ (a − j)wa−1 (with
equality for positive and odd j ≤ 2a − 1). In particular, this yields wa−1 = −wa+1.
On the other hand, taking j = a + 1 from (11) we get wi ≥ (i − a)wa+1 and, further,
wi ≥ (a − i)wa−1. Hence for all i > 0 it holds that wi ≥ (a − i)wa−1 (with equality
for positive and odd i ≤ 2a − 1). For odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 1 this implies
wi − wi+1 ≤ wa−1. (12)
On the other hand, for even 2 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2 this implies
wi − wi+1 ≥ wa−1. (13)
Let qi = P(Z = i). Then wi − wi+1 = qi + qi+1 and, from (12)–(13) we get
qi + qi+1 ≤ wa−1 (for all odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 1) and qi + qi+1 ≥ wa−1 (for all even
2 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2). Hence for all odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 3 we have qi + qi+1 ≤ qi+1 + qi+2
and for all even 2 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2 we have qi + qi+1 ≥ qi+1 + qi+2. Thus there exist
di ≥ 0 (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2) such that
qi − qi+2 + di = 0, for odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2 (14)
−qi + qi+2 + di = 0, for even 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 2. (15)
In the case of odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 1, (11) becomes equality and it yields wi =
(a − i)wa−1. Thus wi −wi+2 = 2wa−1 (for odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a −3) and so wi −wi+2 =
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wi+2 − wi+4 (for odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 5). Since wi − wi+2 = qi + 2qi+1 + qi+2, so
this implies
qi + 2qi+1 − 2qi+3 − qi+4 = 0, for odd 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 5. (16)
Moreover, since w2a−1 − w2a+1 ≤ 2wa−1 (as w2a−1 = −(a − 1)wa−1 and w2a+1 ≥
−(a + 1)wa−1), so in the case of i = 2a − 3 we have inequality w2a−3 − w2a−1 ≥
w2a−1 − w2a+1. Thus there exist d2a−1 ≥ 0 such that
q2a−3 + 2q2a−2 − 2q2a − d2a−1 = 0 (17)
(recall that, by Theorem 2, q2a+1 = 0). Equations 14–17 can be obtained for odd a as
well, taking i = a − 2, j = a − 2 and noticing that wa−2 = wa+2.
Observe also that since
∑+∞
i=0 qi = 1 and
∑+∞
i=0 iqi = a, so
∑+∞
i=0 (i − a)qi = 0.
Since Z ≤ 2a, so in this case
2a∑
i=0
(i − a)qi = 0. (18)
Lemma 1 The set of solutions of the system of Eqs. 14–18 with additional constraints:
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2a, (19)
di ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2a − 1, (20)










z−1 = uaO, z0 = uaE, zi = wai , for 1 ≤ i ≤ a − 2,
za−1 = 2a




a + 1 u
a
O↑1, za = uaO↑1,
and di ,−1 ≤ i ≤ a, satisfy Constraints (20).
(Proof of Lemma 1 is moved to the Appendix).
If Z is optimal, then it must satisfy Eqs. 14–18 with Constraints (19)–(21). Hence,
by Lemma 1, it must be that
Z = λOU aO + λEU aE +
a−2∑
j=1
















with λO +λE +∑a−1j=1 λ j +λO↑1 = 1 and λO, λE, λO↑1, λi ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a −1.
Consider any distribution T ai,2a with odd 1 ≤ i < a. Then, by (3), (4)–(6)
































− p2a−2 − p0
2a
)
− a − 1




+ λO↑1 H(U aO↑1, T ai,2a),
where pk = P(T ai,2a = k). Since E(T ai,2a) = a and p2 j = 0, for 0 ≤ j ≤ a − 1
(as 1 ≤ i < a is odd), so this reduces to





H(U aO↑1, T ai,2a) + λO↑1 H(U aO↑1, T ai,2a).
By (8),




)⎛⎝p0 − 1 + 2a−1∑
j=1







)⎛⎝p0 − 1 − p2a + 2a∑
j=1








E(T ai,2a) − 1 + p0 − p2a
) = p2a − p0
a − 1 =
p2a
a − 1 .
(notice that p2a > 0). Inserting this into the equation above we get
H(Z , T ai,2a) = −
(
λa−1





On the other hand, by (10), it must be that H(Z , T ai,2a) ≥ 0. Thus it must be that
λO↑1 ≥ a−1a+1λa−1. Hence any optimal Z can be represented as
Z = λOU aO + λEU aE +
a−1∑
i=1
λi W ai + λ′O↑1U aO↑1,
where λ′O↑1 = λO↑1 − a−1a+1λa−1 ≥ 0 and λO + λE +
∑a−1
i=1 λi + λ′O↑1 = 1. Therefore
Z ∈ conv
(
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On the other hand it can be easily checked that for any Z ∈ U a ∪ W a ∪











for any Z ∈ conv
(
U a ∪ W a ∪ {U aO↑1}
)
. Thus Z satisfies (10), which implies that Z
is optimal (i.e. such that Y is optimal). unionsq
In the case of b < a with integer a and b close to a the structure of optimal strate-
gies for B is like in the case of b ≤ a − 1, but not every Z from Theorem 3 leads to
an optimal strategy. Theorem 4 below characterize completely all the Z that do, thus
providing complete characterization of optimal strategies for B in this case as well.
Theorem 4 Let a = m and b = m − β, where m ≥ 1 is an integer and 0 < β < 1.











Z , with Z ∈ conv(U m ∪ Y m,β), where
– Y m,β = ∅, if m = 1,
– Y m,β = (βσW m + (1 − βσ)U m) ∪
(
βδU mO↑1 + (1 − βδ)U m
)
, if m ≥ 2 and
0 < β ≤ m2m+1 ,
– Y m,β = W m ∪
(
βδU mO↑1 + (1 − βδ)U m
)
∪ ( (1 − (1 − β)σρ) U mO↑1 + (1 − β)
σρW m
)
, if m ≥ 2 and m2m+1 < β < 1, where
δ = m − 1
m − β , σ =
2m
m − β , ρ =
m
m + 1 .
Proof It is easy to check that for any Z ∈ U m ∪ Y m,β and any X with E(X) =
m, H(Z , X) ≥ − ( a−bb ) p0, in the two cases given above. Hence H(Z , X) ≥
− ( a−bb ) p0, for any z ∈ conv(U m ∪ Y m,β). Thus Z satisfies Ineq. 10, which, as
we observed in proof of Theorem 3, means that Z is optimal (i.e. such that Y is
optimal).
What remains to be shown is the left to right implication, i.e. that if Z is optimal, then
Z ∈ conv(U m ∪ Y m,β). Consider the case with m = 1 first. By Theorem 2, Z ≤ 2
in this case and we need to find the values of q0, q1 and q2, where qi = P(Z = i).
From q0 + q1 + q2 = 1 and q1 + 2q2 = 1 (as E(Z) = 2), we get q0 = q2. Hence any
Z must be a convex combination of U 1, which completes the proof of this case.
Suppose now that m ≥ 2. As was already shown in proof of Theorem 3, if Z is
optimal, then it must be that Z ∈ conv
(
U m ∪ W m ∪ {U mO↑1}
)
. Thus any optimal Z
can be represented as
Z = λU U m + λW W m + λO↑1U mO↑1, (24)
where U m ∈ conv(U m) , W m ∈ conv(W m) , λU + λW + λO↑1 = 1 and 0 ≤
λU , λW , λO↑1 ≤ 1. Consider a strategy T m0, j (as defined in proof of Theorem 3),
with odd j such that m + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1. Then, by (4)–(6) and (8):
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+ λO↑1 ≤ βδ. (26)
where δ = m−1
m−β and σ = 2mm−β .
Suppose that 0 < β ≤ m2m+1 (in which case 0 ≤ βσ ≤ 1). Inequality 26 implies
that λW ≤ βσ and λO↑1 ≤ βδ. Hence λW and λO↑1 can be represented as α1βσ
and α2βδ, respectively, with 0 ≤ α1, α2 ≤ 1. From this and from (26) we also get
α1 + α2 ≤ 1. Now, Eq. 24 can be rewritten as:
Z = α3U m + α1((1 − βσ)U m + βσ W m) + α2((1 − βδ)U m + βδU mO↑1),
where α3 = λU − α1(1 − βσ) − α2(1 − βδ) = λU + λW + λO↑1 − (α1 + α2) =
1 − (α1 + α2). This shows that any optimal Z can be represented as a convex combi-
nation of vectors in U m ∪ (βσW m + (1 − βσ)U m) ∪
(
βδU mO↑1 + (1 − βδ)U m
)
.
Suppose that m2m+1 < β < 1 (in which case 0 < (1 −β)σρ < 1). By (26), λO↑1 ≤
βδ − λW δσ . Hence λO↑1 can be represented as α
(
βδ − λW δσ
)
, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We
rewrite Eq. 24 as
Z = α1U m + α2W m + α3
(




(1 − β) σρW m + (1 − (1 − β) σρ) U mO↑1
)
α1 = λU − α3(1 − βδ), α2 = λW − α4(1 − β)σρ = λW (1 − α), α3 =
α
1−βδ−λW (σ−δ)/σ
1−βδ and α4 = λW α δ(1−β)(βσ−1)(1−βδ)(1−(1−β)σρ) = λW α (m−β)(m+1)2m2(1−β) . It is
easy to check that α3βδ + α4(1 − (1 − β)σρ) = λO↑1 and, consequently, that
α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 1. It is also easy to see that α2, α4 ≥ 0. By the fact that
β > m2m+1 we also have α3 ≥ 0. For α1 notice that adding σ−δσ λW to both sides
of (26) and using the fact that λW + λO↑1 = 1 − λU , from (26) we get
λU ≥ 1 − βδ − λW σ − δ
σ
. (27)
From this it follows that α1 ≥ 0. This shows that if m2m+1 < β < 1, then any optimal
Z can be represented as a convex combination of vectors in
U m ∪ W m ∪
(























- U mO and UmE - U mO↑1
- W m1 - W m2
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 60 z
FY*(z)
Fig. 1 Cumulative distribution functions for (extreme) optimal strategies of player B in discrete General
Lotto game Γ (3, 2)
Let us illustrate the results above with two examples. First, consider a game Γ (4, 1).
Then the value of the game is 3/4 and the strategy Y 0 = (25/32)10 + (1/16)12 +
(1/32)14 + (1/16)15 + (1/16)17, given as an example in Hart (2008) of one of the
strategies not captured by Theorem 2, is (3/4)10 + (1/4)W 42 .
Second, consider a game Γ (3, 2). The value of the game is 1/3 in this case. Any
optimal strategy of player B is in this case a convex hull of the strategies 13 10 +
2




11 + 1313 +
1
3
15, U 3E =
1
4







10 + 1612 +
1
3












12 + 12 14.
Cumulative distribution functions for these strategies are presented in Fig. 1. This
figure allows us to examine how the new strategies add to the bounds of the region
where the (known) optimal strategies lie. The grey region represents the area identified
by Hart (2008), where the strategies being convex combinations of U 3O and U 3E lie.
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The extension in terms of bounds comes from the strategy U 3O↑1. Of course not every
strategy lying within the region is an optimal strategy for player B and even though
the strategies W 31 and W 32 do not extend the bounds, they allow for obtaining new
strategies which would not be obtainable by combining U 3O,U 3E and U 3O↑1 only.
It is also interesting to compare the optimal strategies of the disadvantaged player
in the continuous and discrete variants of General Lotto games. The cumulative dis-
tribution function for the continuous variant is the black line in Fig. 1, depicting
the function 13 + z9 . Any optimal strategy in the discrete variant can be represented
as 13 10 + 23 conv
(
{U 3O,U 3E, W 31 , W 32 ,U 3O↑1}
)
, and the second part of this expression
illustrates how the optimal strategies in the discrete variant approximate the uniform
distribution in the continuous variant. As could be already concluded from the result
obtained in Hart (2008), an optimal strategy of the disadvantaged player in the dis-
crete variant may, but does not have to, be a uniform discrete distribution over the set
{1, . . . , 6}. The full characterization given in Theorem 3 allows us to see that such an
optimal distribution may be even further away from the uniform distribution (as for
example the U 3O↑1 extreme) and does not even have to be a combination of uniform
distributions on any subset of {1, . . . , 6} (as it involves W 31 and W 32 ).
4.2 The case of non-integer a and b ≤ a
Now we move to the case of b ≤ a. The following theorem characterizing this case
was shown in Hart (2008).
Theorem 5 (Hart) Let a = m + α and b ≤ m, where m ≥ 1 is an integer and
0 < α < 1. Then the value of General Lotto game Γ (a, b) is
val Γ (a, b) = (1 − α)a − ba + α
a − b




m + 1 .
The optimal strategies are as follows:
(i) Strategy Y ∗ = (1 − b/m)10 + (b/m)U mE is the unique optimal strategy of
Player B.
(ii) The strategy X∗ = (1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O is an optimal strategy of Player A
and, when b = m, so are (1 − α)V + αU m+1O for all v ∈ conv(U m).
(iii) Every optimal strategy X of Player A satisfies Y ≤ 2m + 1; moreover, it also
satisfies X ≥ 1, when b < m, and
P(X = 0) ≤ 1 − α
m + 1 ,
when b = m.
Thus apart from providing the value of the game, this theorem gives the unique
optimal strategy for the disadvantaged player B. It also gives examples of optimal
strategies for player A and provides bounds on the probability player A puts on 0
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and on the maximal value that can obtain non-zero probability. What is missing is the
complete characterization of optimal strategies for the advantaged player A. We give
this characterization in the theorem below.
Theorem 6 Let a = m + α and b ≤ m, where m ≥ 1 is an integer and 0 < α < 1.
The strategy X is optimal for Player A if and only if
X ∈ conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α) , where
– U m,α = (1 − α)U m + αU m+1O , if b = m,
– U m,α =
{
(1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O
}
, if b < m
and
– X m,α = αδV m + (1 − αδ)U m, if 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 and b = m,
– X m,α = αδV m + (1 − αδ) U mO , if 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 and b < m,
– X m,α = (1 − α)σV m + (1 − (1 − α)σ) U m+1O , if m+12m+1 < α < 1, where
δ = 2m + 1




Proof Suppose that X is an optimal strategy for player A. Consider any strategy Y of
player B of the form (1 − b/m) 10 + (b/m)Z , where E(Z) = m. Then






















where p0 = P(X = 0). Since E(Y ) = b so, by Theorem 5 and Eq. 28,
H(X, Z) ≥ α






for any Z with E(Z) = m. Since, by Theorem 5, any optimal X satisfies P(X = 0) = 0
if b < m, so (29) can be replaced with
H(X, Z) ≥ α
m + 1 , (30)
Let T mi, j , with 0 < i ≤ m ≤ j be defined like in proof of Theorem 3. By Eq. 30 for
any optimal X we have
H(Z , T mi, j ) = λH(X, 1i ) + (1 − λ)H(X, 1 j ) ≥
α
m + 1 .
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Like in proof of Theorem 3 we take wi = H(Z , 1i ) to obtain
( j − m)wi + (m − i)w j ≥ α( j − i)
m + 1 . (31)
Since the strategy (1 − b/m) 10 + (b/m)U mE is optimal for player B, so for any
optimal X we have equality in (30) for Z = U mE , as well as for Z = T mi, j , with even
0 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ j ≤ 2m (c.f. proof of Theorem 3 for similar analysis and arguments
used there). Hence for i and j even and such that 0 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ j ≤ 2m, (31) becomes
equality.
Suppose that m is odd. Taking i = m − 1 from (31) we get
w j ≥ −( j − m)wm−1 + α( j − m + 1)
m + 1 (32)
(with equality for even m ≤ j ≤ 2m). Similarly, taking j = m + 1 we get
wi ≥ −(m − i)wm+1 + α(m + 1 − i)
m + 1 (33)
(with equality for even 0 ≤ i ≤ m). Since m − 1 and m + 1 are even so, from (32) we
get
wm+1 = −wm−1 + 2α
m + 1 . (34)
From this and from (33) we find out that (32) holds for all j ≥ 0, with equality for all
even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m. For even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m this implies
w j − w j+1 ≤ wm−1 − α
m + 1 . (35)
On the other hand, for odd 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1 this implies
w j − w j+1 ≥ wm−1 − α
m + 1 . (36)
Let p j = P(X = j). Then w j − w j+1 = p j + p j+1 and, from (35)–(36) we get
p j +p j+1 ≤ p j+1+p j+2 (for all even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m−2). and p j +p j+1 ≥ p j+1+p j+2
(for all odd 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1). Thus there exist d j ≥ 0 (with 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1) such
that
p j − p j+2 + d j = 0, for even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 2 (37)
−p j + p j+2 + d j = 0, for odd 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1. (38)
In the case of even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 2, (32) becomes equality and it yields
w j − w j+2 = 2wm−1 − 2α
m + 1 ,
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for all even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 2. Thus w j − w j+2 = w j+2 − w j+4 (for all even
1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 4) and, since wi − wi+2 = pi + 2pi+1 + pi+2, so this implies
p j + 2p j+1 − 2p j+3 − p j+4 = 0, for even 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 4. (39)
Moreover, in the case of j = 2m−2 we have inequality w2m−2−w2m ≥ w2m−w2m+2.
Thus there exist d2m ≥ 0 such that
p2m−2 + 2p2m−1 − 2p2m+1 − d2m = 0 (40)
(recall that, by Theorem 5, p2m+2 = 0). Equations 37–40 can be obtained for even m
as well, taking i = m − 2 and j = m + 2.
Observe also that since
∑+∞
i=0 pi = 1 and
∑+∞
i=0 i pi = m, so
∑+∞
i=0 (i − m)pi = 0.
Since Z ≤ 2m + 1, so in this case
2m+1∑
i=0
(i − m)pi = 0. (41)
Lemma 2 The set of solutions of the system of Eqs. 37–41 with additional constraints:
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2m + 1, (42)
di ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2m, (43)









i=0 λi = 1,
zm+1 = (1 − α)umO + αum+1O ,
and
– in the case of 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 : λi ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m and i = m +1, λ0 +λm ≥
0, and
z0 = (1 − α)umE + αδvmm + α(1 − δ)umO, zi = αδvmi + (1 − αδ)umO,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, δ = 2m+1
m+1 and d j , with 0 ≤ j ≤ m+1, satisfy Constraints (43);
– in the case of m+12m+1 < α < 1: λi ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and
z0 = (1 − α)umE + αum+1O , zi = (1 − α)σ vmi + (1 − (1 − α)σ)um+1O ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, σ = 2m+1
m
and d j , with 0 ≤ j ≤ m+1, satisfy Constraints (43).
(Proof of Lemma 2 is moved to the Appendix).
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Let x be a stochastic vector representing X . If X is optimal, then it must satisfy




λi zi , (45)
with
∑m+1
i=0 λi = 1 and additional properties depending on the value of α.
Suppose first that 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 and b < m. Then, by point (iii) of Theo-
rem 5, it must be that λ0 = 0 and, consequently, λm ≥ 0. Hence any optimal X ∈
conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α) with U m,α = {(1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O } and X m,α = αδV m +
(1 − αδ) U mO .
Secondly, suppose that 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 and b = m. By Lemma 2, it must be that
X = λ0
(









(1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O
)
in this case. Consider any distribution T mi,2m+1 with even 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let qk =
P(T mi,2m+1 = k). By (4)–(7) and the fact that E(T mi,2m+1) = m and q2 j−1 = 0, for any
1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have
H(U mE , T
m
i,2m+1) = 1 −
E(T mi,2m+1) + 1
m + 1 = 0
H(U m+1O , T
m
i,2m+1) = 1 −
E(T mi,2m+1)
m + 1 =
1
m + 1
H(V mj , T
m
i,2m+1) = 1 −
2E(T mi,2m+1)
2m + 1 +
q2 j−1
2m + 1 =
1
2m + 1
H(U mE , T
m















P(T mi,2m+1 ≥ i)
)









Thus, by (3), we have
H(X, T mi,2m+1) = λ0
(
αδ













































































On the other hand, by (30), it must be that H(X, T mi,2m+1) ≥ αm+1 . Thus it must be
that
α





λi + 1 − α
m
λm+1,
(note that q2m+1 > 0) which can be reduced to


















λ′i zi + λ′′i z′i
)+
λ′m+1zm+1 where
λ′0 = βλm+1, λ′m+1 = (1 − β)λm+1,
λ′i = βλi , λ′′i = (1 − β)λi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,




z′0 = zm+1 + z0 − zm = αum+1O + (1 − α)umE ,
z′i = zi +
1 − αδ
1 − α (z0 − zm) = αδv
m
i + (1 − αδ)umE , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.




i=1 λ′′i = 1, λ′i ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 1,
and λ′′i ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence any optimal X ∈ conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α) with
U m,α = (1 − α)U m + αU m+1O and X m,α = αδV m + (1 − αδ)U m .
Lastly, suppose that m+12m+1 < α < 1. By Lemma 2, it must be that
X = λ0
(











(1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O
)
in this case.
Like in the previous case, consider any distribution T mi,2m+1 with even 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
By (3), (4)–(7) and the fact that E(T mi,2m+1) = m and q2 j−1 = 0, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
we have





λi + λm+1 1 − α
m
q2m+1 = α




On the other hand, by (30), it must be that H(X, T mi,2m+1) ≥ αm+1 . Thus it must be
that λm+1 ≥ 0. Moreover, by point (iii) of Theorem 5, it must be that λ0 = 0 in
the case of b < m. Hence any optimal X ∈ conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α) with X m,α =
(1 −α)σV m + (1 − (1 − α)σ) U m+1O and U m,α = (1 −α)U m +αU m+1O (if b = m)
and U m,α = {(1 − α)U mO + αU m+1O } (if b < m).
To see that the strategies found above are optimal, by Theorem 5, it is enough to
check that
H(X, Y ) ≥ 1 − (1 − α)b
m
− αb
m + 1 , (46)
for any X ∈ conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α) and any Y with E(Y ) = b. Using (3) and
(4)–(7) it can be easily checked that (46) is satisfied for any X ∈ U m,α ∪ X m,α ,
forany case listed in the theorem. Hence it is also satisfied for any X ∈
conv(U m,α ∪ X m,α). unionsq
As an example consider a game Γ (3/2, 1). Then the strategy X = (1/2)11 +
(1/2)12, given as an example in Hart (2008) of one of the strategies not captured
by Theorem 5, is (3/4)V 11 + (1/4)U 1O. Consider also a game Γ (5/2, 1/2). Then the
strategy X = (5/12)11 + (1/4)13 + (1/3)14, given in Hart (2008) as another example
of optimal strategies not captured by Theorem 5, is (5/6)V 21 + (1/6)U 2O.
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Like in the case of Theorems 3 and 4, it is interesting to see how the uniform distri-
bution, being an optimal strategy of player A in the continuous case, is approximated
by discrete distributions. The new results obtained in Theorem 6 show that not all
the strategies used as a building blocks for a mixture being an optimal strategy are
uniform on some subset of the interval [0, 2a + 1]. Secondly, we can see that in the
case of b < a it is possible to have an optimal strategy where non-zero probability
is put on even numbers.
Theorem 6 shows also that the case of b ≤ a with non-integer a can be, in fact,




Another interesting thing that the full characterization we have now allows us to
see, is how the optimal strategies change with smooth change of constraints a and b.
Fix the value of b for example and take an integer a = m > b. By Theorem 2, the
unique optimal strategy of player A is in this case U mO . When a is increased to m + α
(0 < α < m+12m+1 ), then new strategies from the set V m ∪ U m+1O enter as possible
components of an optimal strategy. When α exceeds m+12m+1 , the strategy U
m
O mixed
with the strategies in the set V m is replaced with U m+1O , and U mO remains a component
of the optimal strategies with a coefficient ≤ 1 − α, slowly vanishing, as α gets close
to 1. The strategies from V m remain a component of the optimal strategies with a
coefficient ≤ (1 − α)σ and also vanish slowly as α gets close to 1. Eventually, when
a = m + 1, strategy U m+1O becomes the unique strategy of player A.
5 Connection to the Colonel Blotto game
The Colonel Blotto game is a classic example of allocation games, where two play-
ers compete on different fronts allocating to them their limited resources (see Borel
1921; Tukey 1949; Shubik 1982). The Blotto games were introduced by Borel (1921)
and most variations of the classic games remained unsolved (remarkably though, the
solution of the continuous variant is known already due to Roberson 2006).
The game B(A, B; K ) is defined as follows. There are two players A and B having
A ≥ 1 and B ≥ 1 tokens, respectively, to distribute simultaneously over K urns.
Thus a pure strategy of player A is a K -partition, x = 〈x1, . . . , xK 〉, of A, so that
x1 +· · ·+ xK = A and each xi is a natural number. Similarly, a pure strategy of player
B is a K -partition, y = 〈y1, . . . , yK 〉, of B, so that y1 + · · · + yK = B and each yi is
a natural number.
After the tokens are distributed, the payoff of each player is computed as follows.
For each urn where a player has a strictly larger number of tokens placed he receives
the score 1, while for each urn where a player has a strictly smaller number of tokens
placed, he receives the score −1. The score on the tied urns is 0 for each player. The
overall payoff is the average of payoffs obtained for all urns, that is, given the strategies
x and y of A and B, respectively, it is
2 That is α ≤ m+12m+1 and α ≥ m+12m+1 .
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hB(x, y) = 1K
K∑
i=1
sign(xi − yi ).
The Colonel Blotto is a zero-sum game.
To connect the Colonel Blotto game to the General Lotto game, Hart (2008) pro-
posed first a symmetrized-across-urns variant of this game called the Colonel Lotto
game. In this game, denoted by L (A, B; K ), the urns are indistinguishable and play-
ers simultaneously divide their tokens into K groups, which are then randomly paired.
Thus, again, the strategies of the players are K -partitions and the payoff of each player
is an average over all possible pairings, that is, given the strategies x and y of A and
B, respectively, it is





sign(xi − y j ).
To see the connection between the Colonel Blotto and Colonel Lotto games, given a
pure strategy x of player A, let σ(x) denote a mixed strategy that assigns equal proba-
bility, 1K ! , to each permutation of x . Similarly, given a mixed strategy ξ of player A, let
σ(ξ) denote a mixed strategy obtained by replacing each pure strategy x in the support
of ξ by σ(x). The strategies σ(x) and σ(ξ) are called symmetric across urns. As was
observed in Hart (2008), hB(σ (ξ), y) = hL (ξ, y), for any pure strategy y of player B.
Consequently, hB(σ (ξ), η) = hL (ξ, η), for any mixed strategy η of player B. Anal-
ogously for the strategies of player B. Hence the following observation can be made
Observation 1 (Hart) The Colonel Blotto game B(A, B; K ) and the Colonel Lotto
game L (A, B; K ) have the same value. Moreover, the mapping σ maps the optimal
strategies in the Colonel Lotto game onto the optimal strategies in the Colonel Blotto
game that are symmetric across urns.
Having linked the Colonel Blotto and Colonel Lotto games we are ready to see the
link between them and General Lotto games. Notice that any K -partition 〈z1, . . . , zK 〉
of a natural number C can be seen as a discrete random variable Z with values in the set
{z1, . . . , zK } and the distribution obtained by assigning to each z1, . . . , zK the prob-
ability 1K . The expected value of Z is then E(Z) = CK , which is the average number
of tokens per urn. This construction links the pure strategies x and y or players A and
B in Colonel Lotto game with discrete integer valued random variables X and Y . The
strategies of players A and B in Colonel Lotto game could be seen as non-negative,
integer valued random variables bounded by A and B and having expectations A/K
and B/K , respectively. The payoff hL (x, y) can be then written as
hL (x, y) = H(X, Y ) = P(X > Y ) − P(X < Y ).
General Lotto game could be seen as a generalization of Colonel Lotto game which
allows for strategies of the players to be unbounded random variables. Notice that every
strategy in the Colonel Lotto game L (A, B; K ) is a strategy in the General Lotto game
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Γ (A/K , B/K ; K ), although the opposite is not necessarily true. However, every opti-
mal strategy in a General Lotto game which is a strategy in the corresponding Colonel
Lotto game is an optimal strategy there. Hence one of the approaches to find optimal
strategies for Colonel Lotto games (and, further, for Colonel Blotto games) is to find
the optimal strategies in General Lotto games and see which of them are the strategies
in the aforementioned games. This was partially done in Hart (2008), where, in par-
ticular, the symmetric case of A = B was covered. However, most of non-symmetric
cases were only partially solved.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have found the missing optimal strategies for the players in non-sym-
metric Discrete General Lotto games. These games are an example of allocation games
and have several applications in political competition (Myerson 1993; Sahuguet and
Persico 2006; Dekel et al. 2008), all-pay auctions (Sahuguet and Persico 2006) and
tournaments (Groh et al. 2010). In particular, they could be used to find full charac-
terization of the optimal strategies for the players in discrete variant of the first price
all-pay auctions. This variant was studied by Cohen and Sela (2007), who provide
examples of optimal strategies for players in both symmetric and asymmetric cases
(with restriction to two players in the latter case). Using the game studied here to
obtain full characterization in the multi player case would require, however, studying
a natural extension to more than two players.
The full characterization allows us to compare the optimal strategies in the discrete
and continuous variants of the game and helps to gain insight into how the discrete
restriction affects the equilibrium behaviour. It could be also used for solving the
missing cases of Discrete Colonel Blotto games, which we reserve for future research.
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Appendix
In the analysis below we will use standard notation 1i to denote the i’th unit vector,
In to denote the n × n unit matrix and 0m,n to denote the m × n zero matrix. We will
drop subscripts denoting the dimension of these matrices if it is clear from the context.
Given a sequence of elements a1 · · · an we will use the notation (a1 · · · an)m to
denote a sequence obtained by repeating the sequence m times. Hence, for example,[
1 (0 2)2 0
]T denotes the vector [1 0 2 0 2 0]. If m ≤ 0, then we will use a convention
that (a1 · · · an)m denotes the empty sequence. So, for example,
[
1 (0 2)0 0
]T denotes
the vector [1 0].
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In two of the lemmas we prove below we compute the basis of a null space of matri-









(in the case of









































(0)2(i−1) 1 2 0 −2 −1 (0)2(n−i)−3 ] , if 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2,[
(0)2(i−1) 1 2 0 −2 ] , if i = n − 1.
The computation is by Gaussian elimination and before we give the proofs of the
lemmas we show how Bn can be reduced by Gaussian elimination to a matrix B(2)n ,
which will be used in those proofs. The process of elimination is as follows. First we
add to each row i of Gn the sum of rows j > i of Gn with the same parity as i and
multiply even rows of the resulting matrix by −1. By doing this we obtain
G(1)n =
[
























(0)2 j (1 0)n− j−1 0
]
, if i = 2 j + 1,[
(0)2 j (0 1)n− j−1 0
]
, if i = 2 j + 2.
Next, we eliminate the first 2n + 1 columns of matrix Hn using rows of G(1)n ,
obtaining:
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H(1)n =
[













(0)2(i−1) −1 2 −1 (0)2(n−i−1) ] , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
We proceed further by adding to each row 2 j − 1 of G(1)n the sum of rows k ≥ j
of H(1)n with the same parity as j obtaining:
G(2)n =
[





(1 0 0 0)(n−1)/2
]T
, if n is odd,[
(0 0 1 0)n/2−1 0 0
]T

















(0)2 j (0 2 0 0)(n− j)/2−1 0 2 −1 ] , if i = 2 j + 1 and n − j is even,[
(0)2 j (0 2 0 0)(n− j+1)/2−1 0
]
, if i = 2 j + 1 and n − j is odd,
g(1)i , if i is even.
Next we add to each row i of H(1)n the sum of rows j > i of H(1)n with the same
parity as i and subtract from it the sum of rows j > i of H(1)n with different parity to
i . Multiplying the result by −1 we obtain:
H(2)n =
[





(1 − 1)(n−1)/2]T , if n is odd,[











(0)2(i−1) 1 −2 (0 2 0 − 2)(n−i−1)/2 1 ] , if n − i is odd,[
(0)2(i−1) 1 −2 (0 2 0 − 2)(n−i)/2−1 0 2 −1 ] , if n − i is even.
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Now we are ready to give proofs of Lemmas 1–2.










Ba is defined in Eq. 47 and
[ f1 f2 ] = f = [−a −(a − 1) · · · a − 1 a (0)2a−1 ].
Any solution of (49) is an element of the null space of Aa, Ker(Aa). To find its
basis we proceed by the standard methods, applying Gaussian elimination to Aa first.
Firstly, we reduce Ba to B(2)a , as given in Eq. 48. Next, we eliminate first elements in
columns 2 · · · 2a − 2 of f with rows of G(2)a . Dividing the result by −a we get:
f (1) =
{[
1 (0)2a−2 0 −1 (0 − 1 0 0)(a+1)/2−1 0 ] , if a is odd,[
1 (0)2a−2 − 12 −1 (0 − 1 0 0)a/2−1 0 −1 12
]
, if a is even.
The resulting matrix A(1)a , written column-wise, is:
A(1)a =
[
I2a−1 −g−1 −g0 0 −g1 · · · 0 −ga−1 −ga










(−1 1)(a−1)/2]T , if a is odd,
g−1 =
[ 1
2 0 0 (1 0 0 0)








1 − 2 (1 0 1 − 2) j−1 1 (0)2a−4 j ]T ,
h2 j−1 =
[
(2 − 2) j−1 2 (0)a−2 j ]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌈ a−12 ⌉,
g2 j =
[
0 0 (1 − 2 1 0) j (0)2a−4 j−3]T ,
h2 j =
[
(−2 2) j (0)a−2 j−1]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊ a−12 ⌋,
ga =
[




(1 − 1)(a−1)/2]T , if a is odd,
ga =
[− 12 1 0 (0 0 1 0)a/2−1]T , ha = [(−1 1)a/2−1 − 1]T , if a is even,
Notice that there are a + 2 columns of A(1)a that are associated with free variables.
These are the columns with indexes 2a, 2(a + i) + 1 (with 0 ≤ i ≤ a − 1) and
4a − 1, i.e. the columns where in the upper part of the matrix there are vectors −gi
with −1 ≤ i ≤ a.
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To obtain the basis for the null space of Aa we multiply the free variable columns
by −1 and then fill in the rows by adding eˆTi at positions i = 2a, 2(a + j) + 1 (with
0 ≤ j ≤ a − 1) and 4a − 1. The columns in thus obtained matrix form a basis of the
null space, Ker(Aa) = span {x−1, x0, x1, . . . , xa}, where
x−1 =
{[
0 1 (0 0 0 1)(a−1)/2 0 (−1 01 0)(a−1)/2 0 ]T , if a is odd,[ 1
2 (0 0 1 0)
a/2 (1 0 − 1 0)a/2−1 1 0 0 ]T , if a is even,
x0 =
[





1 −2 (1 0 1 − 2) j−1 1 (0)2a−4 j+2 (2 0 − 2 0) j−1 2 1 (0)2a−4 j+1 ]T ,








0 0 (1 − 2 1 0) j (0)2a−4 j−1 (−2 0 2 0) j−1 −2 0 2 1 (0)2a−4 j−1 ]T ,








0 0 (0 1 0 0)(a−1)/2 0 (1 0 − 1 0)(a−1)/2 1 ]T , if a is odd,[− 12 (1 0 0 0)a/2 (−1 0 1 0)a/2−1 −1 0 1 ]T , if a is even,
















a + 1 x0 =
[ uaEd0
]





2x ′−1 + x1
) = [ wa1d1
]
, where d1 = 12m
[







2x ′−1 + xi−1 + xi
) = [ waidi
]
,
where di = 12m
[
(0)2i−3 1 2 1 (0)2(a−i−1) 2
]T
and 2 ≤ i ≤ a − 2,
x ′a−1 =
2
a + 1 x−1 =
[
2a
a+1 waa−1 − a−1a+1 uaO↑1da−1
]
,





, if a = 2,
x ′a−1 =
1
a + 1 (2x−1 + xa−2) =
[
2a





where da−1 = 1
a + 1
[
(0)2a−5 1 2 0 0
]T
, if a ≥ 3,
x ′a =
1
a − 1 (xa−1 + 2xa) =
[ uaO↑1da
]






Any solution x = [q0, . . . , q2a, d1, . . . , d2a−1] of (49) is a linear combination of




λi x ′i .




, for 1 ≤ i ≤ a − 2 so, from Constraints (19)–(20), we get that λi ≥ 0, for all
−1 ≤ i ≤ a. Additionally, from Constraint (21) and the fact that ∑2aj=0 x ′i j = 1, for













Hence the set solutions of the system of Eq. 14–18 with Constraints (19)–(20) is
conv
({x ′−1, . . . , x ′a}). unionsq











Bm+1 is defined in Eq. 47 and
f = [−m − α −(m − 1) − α · · · m − α m + 1 − α (0)2m+1 ] .
Like in proof of Lemma 1 to find solutions of (50) we find a basis of the null space
of Am using Gaussian elimination. Bm+1 can be reduced to B(2)m+1, as given in Eq. 48.
Next, we eliminate first 2m elements of f with rows of G(2)m+1. Dividing the result by
(m + 1)(1 − α) we get:
f (1) =
{[
(0)2m −u 1 (0 t 0 0)m/2 −w ] , if m is even,[






1−α , if m is even,












1−α , if m is odd.
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row f (1) to rows of G(2)m+1 we get matrix A
(2)
m , which, written column-wise, is:
A(2)m =
[
I2m −g0 0 0 −g1 0 −g2 · · · 0 −gm −gm+1










(1 − 1)(m−1)/2 1]T , if m is odd,
g0 =
[




(−1 1)m/2]T , if m is even,
g2 j−1 =
[
(−2 1− t 0 1− t) j−1 − 2 1− t (0 − t)m−2 j+1]T ,
h2 j−1 =
[
(2 − 2) j 2 (0)m−2 j−1]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌈m2 ⌉,
g2 j =
[
(0 1 − 2 1) j (0)2m−4 j ]T ,
h2 j =
[
(−2 2) j (0)m−2 j ]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋,
gm+1 =
[




(−1 1)(m−1)/2 − 1]T , if m is odd,
gm+1 =
[




(1 − 1)m/2]T , if m is even.
Notice that there are m + 2 columns of A(2)m that are associated with free variables.
There are the columns with indexes 2m + 1, 2(m + i + 1) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ m) and
4m + 3, i.e. the columns where in the upper part of the matrix there are vectors −gi
with 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 1.
To obtain the basis for the null space of Am we multiply the free variable columns
by −1 and then fill in the rows by adding eˆTi at positions i = 2m + 1, 2(m + j + 1)(with 1 ≤ j ≤ m) and 4m + 3. The columns in thus obtained matrix form a basis of
the null space, Ker(Am) = span {x0, x1, . . . , xm+1}, where
x0 =
{ [
(0 u 1 u)(m+1)/2 (1 0 − 1 0)(m−1)/2 1 0 0 ]T , if m is odd,[
1 u (0 u 1 u)m/2 (−1 0 1 0)m/2 0]T , if m is even,
x2 j−1 =
[
(−2 1− t 0 1− t) j−1 − 2 1− t (0 − t)m−2 j+2|(2 0 − 2 0) j−12 1(0)2m−4 j+3
]T
,







(0 1 − 2 1) j (0)2m−4 j+2 (−2 0 2 0) j−1 −2 0 2 1 (0)2m−4 j+1 ]T ,







(1 w 0 w)(m+1)/2 (−1 0 1 0)(m−1)/2 −1 0 1 ]T , if m is odd,[
0 w (1 w 0 w)m/2 (1 0 − 1 0)m/2 1 ]T , if m is even,
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(xm + 2xm+1) =
[
(1 − α)umO + αum+1Odm+1
]
,






and, in the case of m+12m+1 < α < 1,
x ′0 =
1 − α
m + 1 (x0 + xm+1) =
[
(1 − α)umE + αum+1Od0
]









(2 (x0 + xm+1) + x1) =
[
(1 − α)σ vm1 + (1 − (1 − α)σ)um+1Od1
]
,
with σ = 2m + 1
m
and d1 = 1 − α
m
[






(2 (x0 + xm+1) + xi−1 + xi )
=
[
(1 − α)σ vmi + (1 − (1 − α)σ)um+1Odi
]
, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m,
with di = 1 − α
m
[
(0)2i−3 1 2 1 (0)2(m−i) 2
]T
, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m,






(x0 + xm+1) + γ (xm + 2xm+1) + x1) =
[
αδvm1 + (1 − αδ)umOd1
]
,
with δ = 2m + 1
m + 1 , γ =
m + 1 − α(2m + 1)
mα
and d1 = α
m + 1
[






(x0 + xm+1) + γ (xm + 2xm+1) + xi−1 + xi ) =
[
αδvmi + (1 − αδ)umOdi
]
,
with di = α
m + 1
[











with dm = α
m + 1
[




(x0 + xm+1) + x ′m − x ′m+1 =
[
(1 − α)umE + αδvmm + α(1 − δ)umOd0
]
,
with d0 = α
m + 1
[
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Any solution x = [p0, . . . , p2m+1, d0, . . . , d2m] of (50) is a linear combination of




λi x ′i .














Suppose that m+12m+1 < α < 1. Then p0 = λ0 1−αm+1 and d2i−1 = λi 2(1−α)m , for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, by Constraints (42)–(43), we get that λi ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Now, suppose that 0 < α ≤ m+12m+1 . Then p0 = λ0 1−αm+1 , d2i−1 = λi 2αm+1 , for
1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, p2m+1 = λm+1 αm+1 and d2m−1 = (λm + λ0) 2αm+1 . Thus, by Con-
straints (43), we get that λi ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and i = m + 1, as well as
λ0 + λm ≥ 0. unionsq
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